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Abstract
One of the key deciencies of household survey data for measuring poverty and
inequality is that survey nonresponse depends on the income of the respondent,
whereby rich people are less likely to cooperate with household surveys than poor
people. This nonrandom nonresponse may hide the true level of poverty and inequal-
ity. Another potential problem with household survey data which has received scant
attention in the literature is the quality of food conversion factors. Nonrandom er-
rors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors can potentially have a nontrivial
impact on measured poverty and inequality.The paper looks at the impact of errors
and inconsistencies in food conversion factors on measured consumption inequal-
ity. Malawi has been used as case study with data from the Second and the Third
Integrated Household Surveys (IHS2 and IHS3). Two consumption aggregates are
used; an o¢ cial aggregate which is contaminated by errors and inconsistencies in
food conversion factors and a new aggregate which cleans out these problems. The
paper nds that the inconsistencies and errors in the conversion factors were not
random in that they a¤ected the richest households more than the poorest house-
holds. Consequently, the o¢ cial aggregate understates the level of inequality as
measured by the Gini coe¢ cient. Inequality is underestimated by 4.4 and 2.3 Gini
points for 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively. The disparities are not only sizable but
they are also statistically signicant. I also nd that the o¢ cial aggregate progres-
sively underestimates the share accruing to higher percentiles. Nonparametric tests
for Lorenz dominance conrm that these di¤erences in measured inequality are ro-
bust. Using the new aggregate, the paper also nds that inequality is not worsening
overtime as the o¢ cial aggregate suggests. All this implies that the quality of food
conversion factors is critical for the accurate measurement of levels of and trends in
inequality.
Keywords: Conversion factors; inequality; Malawi
1 Introduction
There is considerable debate regarding the relative merits and demerits of using national
accounts data as opposed to survey data to measure poverty and inequality. Using na-
tional accounts data a number of studies (e.g. Sala-i-Martin (2002, 2006), and Pinkovskiy
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and Sala-i-Martin (2009, 2014, 2016) nd more substantial declines in world poverty.
However, studies based on survey data paint a di¤erent picture of slow progress in reduc-
ing poverty (e.g. Chen and Ravallion (2001, 2004, 2010). This di¤erence arises from the
fact that the growth rate of consumption or income from household surveys is slower than
that of consumption or income measured in national accounts (Deaton, 2005; Pinkovskiy
and Sala-i-Martin, 2016). This in turn means that survey-based estimates overstate the
extent of poverty and inequality. Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2016) show that surveys
relative to national accounts perform worse in developing countries that are richer and
that are growing faster.
One of the key deciencies of household survey data for measuring poverty and in-
equality is that survey nonresponse depends on the income of the respondent, whereby
rich people are less likely to cooperate with household surveys than poor people (Deaton,
2005; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2016). This nonrandom nonresponse may hide the
true level of poverty and inequality. Another potential problem with household survey
data which has received scant attention in the literature is the quality of food conversion
factors. Nonrandom errors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors can potentially
have a nontrivial impact on measured poverty and inequality. In developing countries,
current household consumption which is generated from a household living standards sur-
vey is preferred to current household income as an indicator of living standards (Haughton
and Khandker, 2009). Consumption comprises food and non-food items, and by Engels
law the food component is larger than the non-food component. To construct the con-
sumption aggregate for each household one needs food conversion factors to transform
non-standard units of measurement such as heaps, pails, plates, cups and basins into
standard units such as grams or kilograms.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study which has assessed the impact of non-
random quality problems of food conversion factors on measured consumption inequality.
In this paper, I close this knowledge gap by using Malawi as a case study to quantify the
impact of these errors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors on consumption in-
equality. O¢ cial inequality gures are based on consumption data which is contaminated
by these errors and inconsistencies, consequently, the study provides answers to two ques-
tions: Are the levels of inequality in Malawi worse than o¢ cially estimated? Is inequality
worsening overtime? Malawi is an interesting case because although it has experienced a
strong economic growth performance in the recent past, o¢ cial poverty statistics indicate
that the impact of this growth on poverty has been marginal. Specically, the economy
grew at an average annual rate of 6.2% between 2004 and 2007, and marginally decel-
erated to an average growth of 6.1% between 2008 and 2014 (NSO, 2015). But o¢ cial
poverty gures show that the percentage of poor people in Malawi was 52.4% in 2004,
and just marginally declined to 50.7% in 2011 (NSO, 2005, 2012).
This discrepancy between economic performance from the national accounts and sur-
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vey based poverty gures cannot entirely be explained by the fact that survey data is slow
moving as compared to national accounts data. As a matter of fact, a re-examination of
these poverty gures which addresses errors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors
by Pauw et al. (2016) nds lower levels of poverty and a much larger decline in poverty
of 8.4 percentage points from 47.0% in 2004 to 38.6% in 2011. In terms of consumption
inequality, o¢ cial gures which are based on the consumption aggregate that is fraught
with errors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors suggest that inequality has been
worsening overtime; the Gini coe¢ cient signicantly increased from 0.390 in 2004/5 to
0.452 in 2010/11. Just like the levels and trend of poverty, these levels and trajectory of
inequality in Malawi merit further re-examination.
This paper generates three key ndings regarding consumption inequality in Malawi.
First, the di¤erence between the o¢ cial and the new aggregate gets progressively larger as
one moves from the poorest to the richest households; implying that. the inconsistencies
and errors in the conversion factors were not random as they a¤ected the richest house-
holds more than the poorest households. Second, the o¢ cial aggregate understates levels
of consumption inequality. Third, consumption inequality is not worsening overtime as
o¢ cial gures suggest. These results are signicant as they suggest that the quality of
food conversion factors is critical for the measurement of inequality. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, given that many developing countries use consumption as an indicator of welfare,
they also have implications on the possibility that inequality is also underestimated in
other countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A description of the data used
in the study is given in Section 2. Section 3 presents the methodology. This is followed
by a discussion of empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in the paper come from the Second and the Third Integrated Household
Surveys (IHS2 and IHS3) conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). The two
surveys are comparable overtime, and they are statistically designed to be representative
at both national, district, urban and rural levels. Both surveys used a stratied two-stage
sample design where all districts constitute the strata. Within each district, and for IHS2
and IHS3 respectively, the primary sampling units (PSUs) selected at the rst stage are
the census enumeration areas (EA) dened for the 1998 and 2008 Malawi Population
and Housing Censi. Sample EAs were selected within each district systematically with
probability proportional to size. In the second stage, a random systematic sampling was
used to select households from the household listing for each sample EA. The IHS2 was
done from March 2004 to March 2005, while the IHS3 was conducted from March 2010
to March 2011. The total number of households in the IHS2 is 11280; 1440 (representing
3
12.8%) are urban households, and 9840 (representing 87.2%) are rural households. The
IHS3 collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233 (representing 18.2%)
are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural households.
Both surveys collected information on food consumption at the household level using
the last seven days as the recall period. They collected data on 115 and 124 food items for
IHS2 and IHS3 respectively. The food items are organized into eleven categories: cereals,
grains and cereals products; roots, tubers and plantains; nuts and pulses; vegetables; meat,
sh and animal products; fruits; cooked food from vendors; milk and milk products; sugar,
fats and oil; beverages; and spices and miscellaneous. The quantity of food consumed by
a household comes from three possible sources; purchased, own production, and gifts or
donations. Each one of the three components requires the specication of quantity unit
codes, ranging from standard units (metric) such as kilograms and litres to non-standard
units such as heaps, pails, plates, cups and basins. The non-standard units are rst
converted into grams by using conversion factors. The conversion factors are compiled by
the Malawi National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO) after surveying retail markets across Malawi
to measure actual weights of common food items typically traded in non-metric units.
All other metric units (e.g. kilograms and litres) are also converted to grams. Only
purchased food items have monetary expenditure amounts, and these expenditures are
then used to compute unit values (Malawi Kwacha per gram) by dividing expenditure on
a food item by its corresponding quantity in grams. Expenditure on a food item is then
generated by simply multiplying its unit value by the total quantity consumed1. Total
food expenditure for each household is just a total of these item-specic expenditures.
In the two surveys, a signicant majority of the quantity unit codes are non-standard.
Precisely, only 22.6% and 33.5% of the unit codes in IHS3 and IHS2 respectively are
standard. The dominance of non-standard units means that the quality of conversion
factors is critical as it can a¤ect the calculation of unit values for food items consumed
by a household, which in turn can a¤ect the computation of total household consumption
expenditure i.e. the welfare indicator. Analysis by Verduzco-Gallo et al. (2014) which was
complemented by Beck et al. (2015) and Pauw et. al. (2016) uncovered inconsistencies
and errors in the o¢ cial conversion factors which come with the IHS2 and IHS3 datasets,
and they consequently developed a new and cleaner set of conversion factors to address
these problems2.
Similar to Pauw et al. (2016) and Beck et al. (2015), this paper uses the revised
1To compute the unit values, the procedure used in generating the o¢ cial aggregate is adopted.
Specically, if a household consumed a food item not purchased in the past seven days, the median unit
value from its cluster is used to value that consumption. If no other household consumed the same item
in that cluster or if there were not enough observations to obtain a reliable unit value, the median unit
value from the immediate upper level (e.g. district) is used to value that consumption.
2An example of these inconsistencies in the o¢ cial conversion factors is the case of sachets of cooking
oil in the IHS2 which weigh approximately 50g. The o¢ cial conversion conversion factor is 456g. Thus,
there is an almost ten-fold overestimation of the quantity by o¢ cial conversion factor (Beck et al. 2015).
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set of conversion factors to generate a new annualized consumption aggregate for each
household. Both the o¢ cial and the new consumption aggregates have the same non-food
component, but only di¤er in their food component. Figure 1 presents non-parametric
estimates of the density of the two consumption aggregates (in logs) for 2004/5 (the left
panel) and 2010/11 (the right panel). The o¢ cial aggregate is represented by continuous
lines and those for the new aggregate by dashed lines. For both years, the distribution of
the new consumption aggregate is to the right of the o¢ cial aggregate. This means that
in both years the o¢ cial aggregate understates household welfare. This in turn explains
why Pauw et al. (2016) and Beck et al. (2015) found lower levels of poverty in both years
by using the new aggregate as compared to the o¢ cial aggregate.
The plots also show the elongation of the right tail of the distribution of the new
consumption aggregate; implying that the richest individuals are richer than is the case
when the o¢ cial aggregate is used. Table 2 quanties this right-tail elongation. For both
years, the 99th percentile of the new aggregate is about 18% larger than that of the o¢ cial
aggregate. Furthermore, the left tail of the distributions of the new aggregate are also
elongated, and this especially more evident when one looks at the 2004/5 aggregate. This
means that with the new aggregates, the poorest individuals are poorer than suggested by
the o¢ cial aggregates. The results for this left-tail elongation show that the 1st percentile
of the new aggregate for 2004/5 is 3% smaller than that of the o¢ cial aggregate, however,
the right-tail elongation is clearly more pronounced than the left-tail one.
Essentially, the results suggest that the di¤erence between the o¢ cial and the new
aggregate gets progressively larger as one moves from the poorest to the richest house-
holds. All this means that the inconsistencies and errors in the conversion factors were
not random as they a¤ected the richest households more than the poorest households.
This twin-tail elongation has implications for measuring inequality as it suggests that the
gap between the haves and the have nots is wider than o¢ cially estimated. This paper
quanties these inequality di¤erences.
3 Methods
Given its popularity, o¢ cial inequality measurement in Malawi uses the Gini coe¢ cient
(see for example NSO (2005, 2012)). In order to be consistent with o¢ cial statistics, and to
ensure comparability, I investigate di¤erences in measured inequality between the o¢ cial
consumption aggregate and the new aggregate by using the Gini coe¢ cient. Ignoring
sampling weights for ease of exposition, the Gini coe¢ cient, G, is dened as follows (see
for example (Duclos and Araar, 2006))
G =
2

cov(Q(p); p) (1)
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where, Q(p) is a quantile function, and it gives per capita consumption expenditure of
that individual whose rank or percentile in the distribution is p 2 [0; 1],  = 1
N
NX
i=1
Q (pi)
is the mean of per capita consumption expenditure; and cov(:) is a covariance. The value
of the Gini coe¢ cient ranges between 0 and 1; with 0 implying perfect equality, and 1
denoting perfect inequality.
I test for the statistical signicance of two di¤erences in the Gini coe¢ cients. First,
for each year, I look at the di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cients between the o¢ cial and
the new consumption aggregate, G = Go¢ cial   Gnew. If G < 0 (G > 0) then the
o¢ cial aggregate understates (overstates) inequality in a given year. Second, for each
aggregate, I test for the di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cient between the two periods, 2004/5
and 2010/11, G0 = Go¢ cial2004=5   Go¢ cial2010=11. If G0 < 0 (G0 > 0) then inequality using the
o¢ cial aggregate has fallen (risen) overtime. For the new aggregate, this di¤erence is
computed in a similar manner. Bootstrapped standard errors which account for complex
survey design features are used for the statistical tests. I also talk about the economic
signicance of the di¤erences by simply looking at their magnitude.
The Gini coe¢ cient despite its popularity has a number of weaknesses (Jann, 2016).
First, a Gini coe¢ cient does not allow one to obtain a more detailed picture about the
changes in the distribution which lead to changes in the Gini coe¢ cient. Second, the Gini
coe¢ cient does not capture signicant changes in the shape of a distribution even if the
Gini coe¢ cient itself remains unchanged. Finally, except for the highest value (1) and the
lowest value (0), the interpretation of specic intermediate values is rather di¢ cult. In
addition to the Gini coe¢ cient, I use percentile shares which overcome these weaknesses.
Percentile shares are becoming popular for analysing inequalities (Piketty, 2014;
Piketty and Saez, 2014). They measure the proportions of total outcome (total con-
sumption in the context of this study) that accrue to di¤erent groups dened in terms of
their relative ranks in the distribution. Formally, a percentile share (with no sampling
weights to avoid notational clutter) is dened as (Jann, 2016)
S(p`; p` 1) = L(p`)  L(p` 1) (2)
where L(p`) =
PN
i=1 yiIyiQp`PN
i=1 yi
and L(p` 1) =
PN
i=1 yiIyiQp` 1PN
i=1 yi
are ordinates of a Lorenz
curve in nite population form, IyiQp` 1 is an indicator function equal to 1 if yi  Qp` 1 is
true and 0 otherwise. As is the case with the Gini coe¢ cient, I also consider two di¤erences
or contrasts. First, I examine di¤erences in measured percentile shares between the o¢ cial
and the new consumption aggregate. Second, for each aggregate, the paper explores the
di¤erence in percentile shares between the two periods, 2004/5 and 2010/11.
These distributional contrasts are computed as arithmetic di¤erences. Given per-
centile share estimates from the o¢ cial and new consumption aggregate, the estimated
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vector of arithmetic contrasts is expressed as (Jann, 2016)
s^o¢ cial(p)  s^new(p) (3)
where for each aggregate s^(p) =
h
S1 S2    Sk
i
is a 1k vector of a disjunctive and ex-
haustive set of percentile shares across the domain of p using cuto¤s p =
h
p1 p2    pk
i
with p` < p` 1 for all ` = 0; :::; k and p1 = 0 and pk = 1. Jann (2016) derives the variance
matrix for this di¤erence asX
s^
=
h
Ik  Ik
i bV nhs^o¢ cial(p) s^new(p)io hIk  Iki0 (4)
where Ik is an identity matrix of dimension k:and bV f   g is the joint variance matrix
of the percentile shares across the aggregates. Between-year di¤erences in percentiles
shares are computed analogously. I then use the standard errors from
P
s^ to test for the
statistical signicance of the di¤erences. These standard errors are adjusted for survey
settings. Similar to the Gini coe¢ cients, the sizes of the di¤erences are used to assess
their economic signicance.
The two scalar inequality measures, the Gini coe¢ cient and percentile shares, are
dependent on the imposition of stronger normative criteria. It is quite plausible that the
observed inequality di¤erences even when they are statistically signicant are primarily
driven by these strict assumptions. To make sure that the di¤erences are robust to the
normative criteria embodied in these scalar indices of inequality, I use a nonparametric
Lorenz dominance test developed by Barrett et al. (2014). Let Lo¢ cial(p) and Lnew(p)
denote Lorenz curves of the o¢ cial and new consumption aggregates respectively. Within
each year, the paper tests the following competiting hypotheses
H10 : Lo¢ cial(p)  Lnew(p) for all p 2 [0; 1] (5)
H11 : Lo¢ cial(p) > Lnew(p) for some p 2 [0; 1]
The null hypothesis is that the Lorenz curve for the new aggregate lies everywhere above
that for the o¢ cial aggregate, and this measures weak Lorenz dominance of Lnew over
Lo¢ cial. Under the null, inequality as measured by using the new aggregate is lower than
inequality based on the o¢ cial aggregate.
Strict Lorenz dominance can also be tested by swapping the roles of Lnew and Lo¢ cialsuch
that the following hypotheses are tested
H20 : Lnew  Lo¢ cial(p) for all p 2 [0; 1] (6)
H21 : Lnew > Lo¢ cial(p)for some p 2 [0; 1]
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This in turn means thatH10 andH
2
1 together indicate strict dominance of Lnew over Lo¢ cial:
The Lorenz curves for the two aggregates can coincide and this is represented by H10 and
H20 . I therefore also test the hypothesis of equality, H
eq
0 : Lo¢ cial(p) = Lnew(p) for all
p 2 [0; 1]. Two test statistics for the null in equations (5) and (6) can be used. One is a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic based on the largest positive di¤erence between
the two Lorenz curves, and the second is a Cramer von Mises test statistic based on the
integral of the positive di¤erence between the two Lorenz curves (Barrett et al. 2014).
The two test statistics give similar results (Barrett et al. 2014), and for this reason
I use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic in this paper. The limiting distributions
of the test statistics are both nonstandard and depend on the underlying Lorenz curves.
Consequently, the Lorenz dominance test is based on the application of bootstrapping
to approximate the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics (Barrett et al. 2014).
Asymptotic p-values from the bootstrap are then used to test the di¤erent hypotheses.
The test statistic for the null of Lorenz curve equality is based on the standard two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Between-year Lorenz dominance tests are conducted
in a similar manner.
4 Results
4.1 Within-Year Inequality
Tables 3 and 4 report within-year percentile shares and Gini coe¢ cients for 2004/5 and
2010/11 respectively. The inequality measures are estimated for the new and o¢ cial
consumption aggregates. Statistical signicance test results for the di¤erence in measured
inequality between the two aggregates are also included. In order to capture spatial
di¤erences, the results are also disaggregated into rural and urban areas.
Regardless of consumption aggregate used, the results indicate high levels of inequality
with the share of the poorest 20% in total consumption markedly lower than of the top
20%. Precisely, and looking at the national level, the contribution of the bottom 20%
ranges from about 5% to about 8%, while the contribution of the richest 20% ranges
from about 42% to about 58%. Additionally, both aggregates show that the share of
the poorest 20% in total consumption is larger in rural areas than in urban areas. For
example, in 2010/11, and employing the new aggregate, the bottom 20% contribute 6.0%
in rural areas and 4.4% in urban areas. I now turn to the main focus of this paper, and
compare and contrast the inequality results for the two consumption aggregates.
Within each year and across rural and urban areas, the Gini coe¢ cient for the o¢ cial
aggregate is lower than that for the new aggregate. This means that the o¢ cial aggregate
understates inequality as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient. At the national level, inequality
is underestimated by 4.4 and 2.3 Gini points for 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively. The
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disparities are not only sizable but they are also statistically signicant. The magnitude
of the mismeasurement is larger in 2004/5 than in 2010/11. Furthermore, the extent of
the underestimation varies with location with the underestimation in both years larger in
rural areas than in urban areas. For instance, in 2004/5, inequality is understated by 6.1
Gini points in rural areas while it is mismeasured by a magnitude of 1.1 Gini points in
urban areas.
The results for the Gini coe¢ cient do not show a more detailed picture about dif-
ferences across the entire distribution of the two aggregates. Percentile shares provide
this detailed picture. In both 2004/5 and 2010/11, the o¢ cial aggregate shows that the
contribution of the bottom 20% is larger than that for the new aggregate. For example, at
the national level, according to the o¢ cial aggregate, the bottom 20% contributes 7.0%
and 5.6% in 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively, in contrast, the corresponding contribu-
tions for the new aggregate are 6.3% and 5.1% in 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively. These
di¤erences are also observed in both rural and urban areas. The results further reveal
that the di¤erence in the 20th percentile between the two aggregates is more pronounced
in rural areas than in urban areas. For instance, using the 2004/5 results, the di¤erence
in the shares for the poorest 20% between the two aggregates are -0.93 and -0.12 for rural
and urban areas respectively. These di¤erences are not only quantitatively large but they
are also statistically signicant.
The pattern is however reversed as one moves up the percentiles; in this instance, the
o¢ cial aggregate progressively underestimates the share accruing to higher percentiles.
This is more evident when one looks at the contributions of the richest 20%. Focusing
on the national level, in 2004/5 the contributions of the top 20% are 46.6% and 50.3%
for the o¢ cial and new aggregates respectively. Similarly, for 2010/11, the richest 20%
contribute 45.2% when the o¢ cial aggregate is adopted while it is 47.4% when the new
aggregate is employed instead. The observed di¤erences for top the 20% are statistically
signicant, and moreover they are larger in magnitude (in absolute terms) as compared
to the results for the bottom 20%.
Are these observed di¤erences in measured inequality between the two aggregates
robust? As noted earlier, the two inequality measures are premised on stronger normative
criteria. It may well be that these observed inequality di¤erences are primarily driven by
these strict assumptions. As a sensitivity check, I use p-values from the nonparametric
Lorenz dominance test results in Table 5. The computation of the p-values for each test
pair used 100 bootstrap replications to simulate the distributions of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov type test statistics. Just like before, the results are presented at the national,
rural, and urban levels for the years 2004/5 and 2010/11. For each one of the three areas,
the rst row in the table reports p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the new
aggregate weakly Lorenz dominates the o¢ cial aggregate against the alternative that the
null is false. In the second row, the hypothesis is reversed in that the null hypothesis that
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the o¢ cial aggregate weakly Lorenz dominates the new aggregate is tested. The last row
tests the null of Lorenz curve equality.
The test results show that at all the three levels for the two years, the null of weak
Lorenz dominance of the new aggregate cannot be rejected at the 1% signicance level.
Furthermore, I fail to reject the null of weak Lorenz dominance of the o¢ cial aggregate
at the 1% signicance level. These two results together suggest that the new aggregate
strictly Lorenz dominates the o¢ cial aggregate, and that inequality as measured by using
the new aggregate is signicantly higher than inequality measured by using the o¢ cial
aggregate. All this therefore means that the nding that the o¢ cial consumption inequal-
ity gures understate the levels of inequality in Malawi is robust to assumptions which
underpin the Gini coe¢ cient and percentile shares.
4.2 Between-Year Inequality
The above discussion has looked at a levels question in the sense that the ndings unam-
biguously show that levels of inequality are underestimated when the o¢ cial aggregate is
adopted. The next question that I address in this paper is about trends: Is consumption
inequality worsening overtime as the o¢ cial gures suggest? Does the new aggregate show
di¤erent inequality trends in Malawi? Table 6 shows di¤erences in measured percentile
shares and Gini coe¢ cients between 2004/5 and 2010/11. The results are also spatially
disaggregated into rural and urban areas.
As hinted already, the results show that when the errors and inconsistencies in food
conversion factors are ignored by using the o¢ cial aggregate there is a clear pattern of
worsening consumption inequality at the national level and for rural areas in Malawi.
Nationally, consumption inequality as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient worsened by 6.2
Gini points from 0.39 in 2004/5 to 0.452 in 2010/11, and for rural areas, inequality
increased by 3.6 Gini points from 0.339 in 2004/5 to 0.375 in 2010/11. The changes
at the national level and for rural areas are both economically large and statistically
signicant. However, the change in urban inequality of 0.07 Gini points is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, and moreover, the change is quantitatively small. Thus,
when the o¢ cial aggregate is used, one comes to the conclusion that urban inequality has
remained unchanged between the two periods.
This trend of worsening inequality nationally and for rural areas as measured by the
Gini coe¢ cient is however in stark contrast to the trend that one gets after correcting
the errors and inconsistencies in food conversion factors by using the new aggregate.
The results show that consumption inequality increased by 4.0 Gini points from 0.434 in
2004/5 to 0.474 in 2010/11 at the national level, by 1.3 Gini points from 0.400 in 2004/5
to 0.413 in 2010/11 for rural areas, and by 2.6 Gini points from 0.495 in 2004/5 to 0.521
in 2010/11 for urban areas. Notably, in terms of size, the change in urban inequality of
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0.07 Gini points from the o¢ cial aggregate pales in comparison to the change of 2.6 Gini
points from the new aggregate. All these changes despite being fairly large in magnitude,
they are all statistically insignicant. This means that when the Gini coe¢ cient is used
as an inequality measure, the changes in inequality based on the new aggregate are not
di¤erent from zero statistically speaking. Critically, using the new aggregate a di¤erent
and more accurate conclusion about the path of inequality in Malawi is reached: inequality
as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient is not worsening overtime.
The results in Table 6 also show the changes across the di¤erent percentiles between
the two periods, and these provide a much fuller picture of the changes across the entire
distribution of each aggregate. The pattern of the changes in terms of whether the contri-
bution of a given percentile is increasing or decreasing depends on the percentile that one
is looking at. For both consumption aggregates, the contribution of the bottom 20% to
total consumption has declined overtime while the contribution of the richest 20% has in-
creased overtime. For the o¢ cial aggregate and looking at the national level, the share in
total consumption of the bottom 80% has declined between the two years. These changes
range from -1.44 percentage points for the rst quintile to -0.67 percentage points for the
fourth quintile. In contrast, the share of the richest 20% has increased by 4.88 percentage
points. These changes are statistically signicant. A similar pattern is observed for rural
areas, however, for urban areas the changes at all percentiles are statistically insignicant.
This is consistent with the earlier nding for the Gini coe¢ cient which showed signicant
worsening inequality at the national level and for rural areas only.
Although the direction of the changes in the shares of a given percentile are similar
to those of the o¢ cial aggregate at the national level and for rural areas, they are only
statistically signicant for the bottom 20%. In addition, the magnitudes of the changes
for the new aggregate are smaller. At the national level, the decrease in the contribution
of the bottom 20% for the o¢ cial aggregate is 1.44 percentage points while it is 1.19
percentage points for the new aggregate. For urban areas, the changes in the shares
across the di¤erent percentiles for the two aggregates are similar in that they are both
not statistically di¤erent from zero.
I also use nonparametric Lorenz dominance test results in Table 7 to investigate
sensitivity of the results to the restrictive normative assumptions underlying the Gini
coe¢ cient and the percentile shares. The rst row in the table reports p-values for the
test of the null hypotheses that each aggregate in 2010/11 weakly Lorenz dominates that
of 2004/5. The second row tests the null hypotheses where the years for each aggregate
have been switched. The last row tests the null that the Lorenz curves between the two
years for each aggregate are identical.
The results indicate that at the national level and for rural areas the o¢ cial aggregate
for 2010/11 strictly Lorenz dominates that of 2004/5 at the 1% signicance level. Further-
more, I fail to reject the null of Lorenz equality for urban areas at all conventional levels
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of signicance. This suggests that measured inequality based on the o¢ cial aggregate
has worsened between 2010/11 and 2004/5 in rural areas but has remained unchanged in
urban areas. Thus, the nding that inequality based on the o¢ cial aggregate increased
between the two years at the national level and for rural areas is robust to assumptions
which underpin the Gini coe¢ cient and percentile shares.
A totally di¤erent and more correct conclusion is however arrived at when the new
aggregate is used. The null hypothesis of equality of the Lorenz curves of the new aggre-
gate between the two years cannot be rejected at all conventional levels of signicance.
This means that when the quality of food conversion factors is improved by using the new
aggregate, one comes the robust conclusion that inequality at the national, rural, and
urban levels is not getting worse in Malawi. Thus, although the levels of inequality are
understated by the o¢ cial aggregate, the inequality trend is such that inequality is not
getting worse.
5 Concluding Comments
The paper has looked at the impact of errors and inconsistencies in food conversion fac-
tors on measured consumption inequality. Malawi has been used as case study with data
from the Second and the Third Integrated Household Surveys (IHS2 and IHS3). Two
consumption aggregates are used; an o¢ cial aggregate which is contaminated by errors
and inconsistencies in food conversion factors and a new aggregate which cleans out these
problems. The paper nds that the inconsistencies and errors in the conversion factors
were not random in that they a¤ected the richest households more than the poorest
households. Consequently, the o¢ cial aggregate understates the level of inequality as
measured by the Gini coe¢ cient. Inequality is underestimated by 4.4 and 2.3 Gini points
for 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively. The disparities are not only sizable but they are also
statistically signicant. I also nd that the o¢ cial aggregate progressively underestimates
the share accruing to higher percentiles. Nonparametric tests for Lorenz dominance con-
rm that these di¤erences in measured inequality are robust. Using the new aggregate,
the paper also nds that inequality is not worsening overtime as the o¢ cial aggregate
suggests.
The ndings can be linked to Malawis economic growth performance. O¢ cial in-
equality and poverty statistics paint a rather dismal impact of the high growth experi-
enced over the study period: poverty declined only marginally and inequality worsened.
With respect to inequality, this paper concludes that although the levels of inequality are
higher than o¢ cial gures suggest, inequality is not worsening. Growth was not ruthless
as previously thought. Besides, as shown by Pauw et al. (2016), the high growth also led
to larger and not marginal poverty reduction. These ndings have implications on the
accurate measurement levels of and trends in inequality. The results indicate that the
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inconsistencies in the quality of the conversion factors are nonrandom as they disfavour
the richest households which in turn leads to a misleading picture of the extent of in-
equality. What all this means is that the Malawi Governments National Statistics O¢ ce
should be pay serious attention to ensuring that the quality of the conversion factors is
improved, which in turn would lead to improved measurement of inequality and poverty
in the future. Besides, given that developing countries use consumption as an indicator
of welfare, the issue of quality of food conversion factors is critical as it suggests as is the
case with Malawi that measured inequality is potentially underestimated in developing
countries. This underestimation has nothing to do with fact that survey nonresponse is
income-dependent.
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Table 1: Trends and levels of economic growth, poverty, and inequality
Indicator/Area 2005 2011
GDP growth 6.2a 6.1b
Poverty headcount
National 52.41 50.64
Rural 55.86 56.62
Urban 25.4 17.28
Gini Coefficient
National 0.39 0.45
Rural 0.34 0.38
Urban 0.48 0.49
a Average GDP growth for 2004-2007, b average GDP growth for 2008-2014.
Source: NSO (2005, 2012a, 2012b), RBM Annual Economic Report (various issues)
Figure 1: Kernel density plots of the two consumption aggregates by survey year
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
de
ns
ity
6 8 10 12 14
log of per capita expenditure
Official Aggregate New Aggregate
2004/5
0
.2
.4
.6
de
ns
ity
8 10 12 14 16
log of per capita expenditure
Official Aggregate New Aggregate
2010/11
15
Table 2: Percentile di¤erences between o¢ cial and new consumption aggregate
Percentiles 1% 5% 50% 95% 99%
2010/11
Official Aggregate 9002.96 13591.66 41582.57 174874.86 424445.16
New Aggregate 9437.97 14361.14 47055.75 201620.44 500225.28
% Difference 4.83 5.66 13.16 15.29 17.85
2004/5
Official Aggregate 5109.88 7006.50 17934.94 61517.50 143998.73
New Aggregate 4950.42 6985.89 18487.63 68023.33 171124.50
% Difference -3.12 -0.29 3.08 10.58 18.84
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Table 5: P-values for within-year Lorenz dominance tests
Test Pair
2004/5 2010/11
National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Lnew ³ Lofficial 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Lofficial ³ Lnew 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.012
Lofficial = Lnew 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Lnew ³ Lofficial (Lofficial ³ Lnew) denotes the null that the new consumption aggregate (the official
consumption aggregate) Lorenz dominates the official consumption aggregate (the new consumption aggregate).
Lofficial = Lnew denotes that the Lorenz curves are identical i.e. no Lorenz dominance.
Table 6: Between-year di¤erences in percentile shares and Gini coe¢ cients
Percentile National Rural Urban
Official New Official New Official New
0-20 -1.440*** -1.193*** -1.095*** -0.876*** -0.360 -0.569
(0.122) (0.186) (0.115) (0.195) (0.287) (0.382)
20-40 -1.445*** -1.024 -0.852*** -0.499 -0.226 -0.474
(0.170) (0.912) (0.144) (0.289) (0.407) (0.614)
40-60 -1.327*** -0.610 -0.615*** 0.116 0.183 -0.120
(0.218) (0.406) (0.167) (0.390) (0.516) (0.850)
60-80 -0.668* -0.004 0.080 0.960 0.552 -0.429
(0.284) (0.578) (0.205) (0.536) (0.677) (1.256)
80-100 4.880*** 2.831 2.482*** 0.299 -0.150 1.592
(0.707) (2.417) (0.490) (1.352) (1.592) (2.933)
Gini Coefficient 0.062*** 0.040 0.036*** 0.013 0.007 0.026
(0.020) (0.028) (0.008) (0.029) (0.040) (0.046)
Observations 23551 23551 19878 19878 3673 3673
Notes: Official and New denote the official consumption and new consumption aggregates respectively. Differences
are between percentile shares and Gini coefficients for 2010/11 and 2004/5 for each consumption aggregate. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
Table 7: Between-year di¤erences in percentile shares and Gini coe¢ cients
Test Pair
National Rural Urban
Official New Official New Official New
L2010/11 ³ L2004/5 0.900 0.300 0.900 0.300 0.900 0.300
L2004/5 ³ L2010/11 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.130 0.810 0.122
L2004/5 = L2010/11 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.200 0.288 0.200
Notes: L2010/11 ³ L2004/5 (L2004/5 ³ L2010/11) denotes the null that a consumption aggregate for year 2010/11 (2004/5)
Lorenz dominates that for year 2004/5 (2010/11). L2004/5 = L2010/11 denotes that the Lorenz curves are identical i.e. no
Lorenz dominance.
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